Invited Speaker: Tim Roughgarden, Stanford: From Bayesian to Prior-Free Optimal Auction Design. 8:30am-9:15am. We define a general template for prior-free optimal mechanism design that explicitly connects Bayesian optimal mechanism design, the dominant paradigm in economics, with worst-case analysis. In particular, we establish a general and principled way to identify appropriate performance benchmarks for prior-free optimal mechanism design. We use this framework to reinterpret the literature on worst-case profit-maximizing auctions, as also use it to design novel "money-burning mechanisms" (optimal mechanisms when transfers are costly).
The above is joint work with Jason Hartline (STOC 2008). Time permitting, we will also briefly discuss another application of Bayesian optimal mechanism design: rigorous efficiency-revenue trade-offs in multi-unit auctions (joint work with Shaddin Dughmi and Mukund Sundararajan).

Invited Speaker: Muthu Muthukrishnan, Google: Potential Mechanisms for Sponsored Search Auctions: Algorithmic Issues. 16:15pm-17:00pm. The Generalized Second Price auction is popular for Sponsored Search. Also, there are other auctions that are potentially suitable. What are potential mechanisms we can use to implement Sponsored Search? This talk will explore some of the directions, and present certain algorithmic results.

Invited Speaker: Glenn Ellison, MIT: Position Auctions with Consumer Search. 8:30am-9:15am.
This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for \sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about rm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benets of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.

Invited Speaker: Peter Cramton, University of Maryland: What can ad auctions learn from other markets?. 10:30am-11:15am.